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A PROPOSAL TO END NLRB DEFERRAL TO THE
ARBITRATION PROCESS
Cornelius J. Peck*
In January 1984 the NLRB, reconstituted by President Reagan's appoint-
ees, announced significant changes in the Board's policies concerning
deferral to the arbitration processes established by employers and unions in
their collective bargaining agreements. 1 The new policies are redolent with
the politics of a changed administration rather than expertise in labor
relations. The changes continue the Board's uncertain treatment of the
relationship between its jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices and
arbitrators' decisions concerning collective bargaining agreements.2 The
newly announced policies are consistent with the conviction that the federal
government should sharply reduce its regulatory activities, transferring its
previous responsibilities to local governments or private initiative. These
policies are also consistent with a view that labor unions are not desirable
institutions that deserve protection to ensure their continued existence and
growth. They reflect a buoyant optimism that, despite the problems associ-
ated with unbridled pursuit of self-interest, all will go well if government
will only go away.
There certainly will be judicial challenges to, and probably rejection of,
at least portions of the new policies. The certainty of judicial review thus
makes it appropriate to reconsider the entire policy of Board deferral to the
arbitration process. This article is such a reconsideration and proposes that
courts should no longer permit the Board to pursue a policy of deferral.
Primary responsibility for development of the policy governing the rela-
tionship between the prevention of unfair labor practices and the arbitration
process should be placed upon the General Counsel of the NLRB, who now
in fact makes the decisions and thus produces the law in action even under
Board announced policies. Questions of deferral have arisen in part because
of the unsatisfactory state of the law concerning the duty to bargain during
the term of a collective bargaining agreement. The present law suggests that
actions taken, usually by employers, may be either violations of the duty to
bargain or violations of the collective bargaining agreement. The proposed
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; Member, National Academy of Arbitrators. The
author expresses his appreciation for the work of David Campbell, Esq., who, as a student, gave valuable
assistance in preliminary research on the subject. Preparation of the article was made possible in part by
a research grant from the University of Washington School of Law for the summer of 1984.
1. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83,115 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1984); Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. No. 86, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1984).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 64-81.
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clarification of the law will eliminate that apparent overlapping of jurisdic-
tions. Other questions now considered under the rubric of deferral would be
better treated simply as evidentiary matters to be considered in determining
whether a complaint should issue on an unfair labor practice charge. The
General Counsel, whose office is an administrative agency for the purposes
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 should use rule-making procedures
to promulgate the rules concerning the effect of a prior arbitration award in
determining whether a complaint shall issue.4 This would not ensure
judicial review of refusals to issue complaints based upon an assessment of
evidentiary matters in every case, but it would offer the opportunity for
review of the policies followed by the General Counsel with respect to
arbitration awards. 5 The General Counsel should also publish at least a
representative sample of arbitration decisions found to justify the dismissal
of charges.
THE NLRB'S DEFERRAL POLICIES
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a review of the Board's
evolution of deferral policies or criticisms of the individual developments
which occurred in the process of that evolution. That has been done
thoroughly and excellently by commentators as they observed that process
of evolution. 6 A short summary statement should suffice.
3. Section 2(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act defines an agency as "each authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency." 5
U.S.C. § 551(1) (1976). The General Counsel is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)
(1982). The NLRB General Counsel thus is not an employee of the Board, as are the general counsels of
many other agencies. He has under the statute "final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the
investigation of charges and issuance of complaints .... " 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,148,158-59 (1975) (the Supreme Court held that
advice and appeal memoranda, which explain decisions by the General Counsel not to file a complaint,
are "final opinions" made in the adjudication of a case as adjudication is defined under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act).
4. The Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d), does not specifically confer power
on the General Counsel to promulgate rules, but the general grant of rulemaking power in section 6 of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982), to the "Board" should extend to the General Counsel of the Board.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 100-08.
6. Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 355
(1971); Christensen, Private Judges, Public Rights: The Role of Arbitration in the Enforcement of the
National Labor Relations Act, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 49 (1976);
Covington, Arbitrators and the Board: A Revised Relationship, 57 N.C.L. REV. 91 (1978); Getman,
Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973); Schatzki, NLRB
Resolution of Contract Disputes Under Section 8(a)(5), 50 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1972); Sherman,
Comment on The NLRB and Arbitration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 138 (1975); Teple, The NLRB Policy of Deferral to
Arbitration, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 563 (1974); Zimmer, Wired for Collyer: Rationalizing NLRB and
Arbitration Jurisdiction, 48 IND. L.J. 141 (1973); Comment, Judicial Review and the Trend Toward
More Stringent NLRB Standards on Arbitral Deferrals, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 738 (1981).
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The possibility of deferral arises in two contexts. The first is when an
arbitrator has rendered an award. The question then is whether the Board
should defer, giving effect to that award in a subsequent unfair labor
practice proceeding. In this context, the Board's decision on-deferral will
vary with the type of unfair labor practice under consideration in the
subsequent proceeding. The second context is when the arbitration process
has not begun, or if begun, has not yet been completed. Here, the question is
whether the Board should stay its process until the arbitration has been
completed. Here also, the Board's response to the deferral problem will
vary, depending upon the unfair labor practice charged.
The Board has approached all deferral questions, regardless of context
and type of unfair labor practice, from a broad reading of section 10(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. 7 That section, which
empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices, contains the express
statement that the power granted, "shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law, or otherwise." 8 The Board views arbitration as a means of
adjustment established by agreement and therefore a process which cannot
affect its power to prevent unfair labor practices. 9
The Board's deferral policies where an arbitrator's award had been
rendered were first stated in a 1955 decision, Spielberg Manufacturing
Co.10 As part of a strike settlement agreement the parties had agreed to
arbitrate the question of whether four strikers should be reinstated despite
the employer's assertion that they had engaged in unprotected conduct on
the picket line. The case, therefore, involved the questions of whether
alleged strike misconduct occurred and, if so, whether it justified termina-
tion of the employment of certain strikers. The Board stated that it would
defer to an arbitrator's award if (1) the arbitration proceedings appeared to
have been fair and regular, (2) all parties had agreed to be bound, and (3) the
decision was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. 1'
The Board accepted the arbitration conclusion that the strikers had engaged
in misconduct which justified termination of their employment without
deciding whether it would have decided the case as did the arbitration
panel. 12 In 1961 in Monsanto Chemical Co., 13 the Board added a fourth
7. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1959).
8. Id.
9. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080,1081-82 (1955); Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf&
Western Systems Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841 (1971).
10. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080.
11. Id. at 1082.
12. Id.
13. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961); see also Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884 (1963), vacated on
other grounds, 326 E2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
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requirement that the unfair labor practice issue have been presented to and
considered by the arbitrator. This position was reversed in 1974 by the
decision in Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 14 in which a divided
Board held that it would defer to an arbitration award in a discipline or
discharge case, even though it appeared that evidence on the unfair labor
practice charged had not been presented to the arbitrator. An exception
would be made where bona fide reasons, other than the attempt to preserve
the opportunity for trial before two forums, were established for the failure
to present evidence on the unfair labor practice in the arbitration proceed-
ing. 15
The Electronic Reproduction decision provoked a sustantial amount of
controversy, which led to its overruling in 1980, again by a divided Board,
in Suburban Motor Freight. 16 That case held that the Board would not defer
to an arbitration award which bore no indication that the arbitrator had ruled
on the statutory issue of discrimination, and placed the burden on the party
seeking deferral to prove that the issue of discrimination was litigated
before the arbitrator. 17 Suburban Motor Freight was reaffirmed by a major-
ity of the Board as recently as August 1982 in Propoco, Inc. 18 A dissenter in
Propoco argued that the Board should defer to the arbitration award if: "(1)
the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue,
and (2) it appears from the record that the arbitrator was presented generally
with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice." 19
In January 1984 the Board, reconstituted by President Reagan's appoint-
ments, decided Olin Corp.20 and overruled Suburban Motor Freight. The
majority adopted the standards suggested by the dissent in Propoco for
determining when the Board will defer to an arbitration award, to which the
majority added a new definition of repugnancy to the policies and purposes
of the Act. The majority will no longer require that an award be totally
consistent with Board precedent. It will defer to an award which is not
"palpably wrong," that is to say not susceptible to an interpretation
consistent with the Labor Management Relations Act. The majority also
placed on the party objecting to deferral the burden of showing that the
standards for deferral have not been met. 21
14. 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 759-61 (1974).
15. Id. at 762.
16. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
17. Id. at 146-47.
18. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., Division of Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136
(1982).
19. Id. at 145.
20. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1984).
21. As Member Zimmerman noted in his partial dissent, there appears to be no sound procedural
ground for placing this burden on the General Counsel, who was not a party to the arbitration
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The Board's deferral practices, where the arbitration process had not
been completed, began with a case entitled Dubo Manufacturing Corp.22 In
that case the Board withheld its processes until the completion of an
arbitration proceeding which a federal district court had ordered. 23 It was
not until 1971, in Collyer Insulated Wire,24 that a Board majority
announced a policy of deferral to arbitration even though the process had
not been undertaken. That case involved a charge that changes by the
employer in wage rates of maintenance employees were unilateral changes
that violated the duty to bargain. The employer contended it was authorized
to make such changes under the collective bargaining agreement and was
willing to arbitrate the dispute under the terms of an arbitration clause that
was unquestionably broad enough to encompass the dispute.25 The majority
dismissed the complaint, but retained jurisdiction over the charge pending a
showing that the dispute was not amicably settled in the grievance and
arbitration procedures, that the procedures were not fair and regular, or that
they reached a result repugnant to the Act.26 As the conditions of retaining
jurisdiction indicate, the majority viewed its action as a withholding of its
undoubted power to remedy an unfair labor practice and not as recognition
that the willingness to arbitrate a contractual dispute could constitute a
discharge of the duty to bargain during the term of the agreement.
One year later, in NationalRadio,27 a majority of the Board extended the
Collyer doctrine to charges of violation of 8(a)(3), again viewing the action
as a witholding of its undoubted power to remedy an unfair labor practice.
Of course, a willingness to arbitrate whether there was just cause for
discharge could not eliminate the unfair labor practice if the discharge was
the result of anti-union motivation. (An arbitration decision that the action
challenged in Collyer was permitted by the agreement would establish that
there had been no refusal to bargain.) As a review of the commentary will
indicate, 28 the National Radio decision was controversial, and it lasted only
five years. In 1977 a divided Board, in General American Transportation
proceeding. Of course, in most if not all cases, the General Counsel's position that there should be no
deferral will support the position of the charging party who may have been a party to the arbitration
proceeding. Individual employees, however, are seldom parties with power to control the course of an
arbitration proceeding. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOuRi, How ARBITRATION WORKS 131-32 (1973).
22. 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
23. Id. at 432.
24. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
25. Id. at 837-38. Other factors favoring arbitration and limiting the scope of the decision were that
(1) the parties had a long and productive collective bargaining relationship, (2) there was no claim of
enmity, (3) the contract obligated the parties to arbitrate disputes, (4) the meaning of the contract was at
the center of the dispute, and (5) the arbitrator could resolve both the contractual dispute and the unfair
labor practice charge. Id. at 842.
26. Id. at 843.
27. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
28. See supra note 6.
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Corp.,29 held that deferral would not be practiced when the unfair labor
practices charged were violations of 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1). On the same day, a
different Board majority, in Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 30 retained the Collyer
principle of deferral when the charges were of violation of 8(a)(5). The
division of views among the Board members warned that the new rules did
not have a guaranteed permanence. In January 1984, on the same day that it
decided Olin Corp., the reconstituted NLRB overruled General American
Transportation Co. The overruling decision, United Technologies Corp., 31
announced that the Collyer principle would be applied to charges of
violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A). Board Member
Zimmerman, a hold-over appointee of President Carter, dissented in both
cases.
On March 6, 1984, the General Counsel of the NLRB issued a memoran-
dum to regional directors establishing guidelines for deferral pursuant to
the Board's decision in United Technologies.32 He noted that for deferral to
occur, the grievance-arbitration provisions of the agreement must "clearly
encompass" the dispute, the charged party must be willing to arbitrate the
dispute and waive any timeliness requirements of those provisions, and,
despite the alleged misconduct, there must be "a workable and freely
resorted to grievance procedure." The history of the relationship between
the parties is to be considered in determining whether the grievance and
arbitration machinery can reasonably be relied upon to function and resolve
the dispute fairly. A special problem arises if a charge is filed by an
individual and the union refuses to process the grievance to arbitration. In
such a case deferral should not be practiced unless the union's refusal is
motivated solely by reason of a desire to avoid deferral. 33 Nor should
deferral be practiced if the interests of the union are adverse to those of the
charging party.34
29. 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 808-09 (1977).
30. 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 829 (1977). Chairman Murphy provided the swing vote by voting to make
one majority in Roy Robinson Chevrolet and to make another majority in GeneralAmerican Transp. Co.
31. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 115 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1984).
32. Memorandum GC 84-5, March 6, 1984, in News and Background Information, 115 Lab. Rel.
Rep. 334. The General Counsel did not follow the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act in promulgating the memorandum. For an argument that refusal of a regional office to
issue a complaint on the basis of the memorandum is subject to judicial review and correction because of
the violation of the APA, see Peck, The Administrative Procedure Act and the NLRB General Counsel's
Memorandum on Fair Representation Cases: Invalid Rulemaking? 31 LAB. L.J. 76 (1980).
33. Footnote 12 of the Memorandum suggests that regional personnel be alert to the possibility that
the employee and the union may have agreed to have the union refuse to process the grievance, all in an
effort to avoid deferral.
34. For a recent decision holding that deferral to arbitration would have been improper see
Handrickson Bros., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 1984-85 NLRB (CCH) § 16,735 (1984).
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SOURCES OF THE DEFERRAL PROBLEM
There would be no need to consider whether the NLRB should defer to
the arbitration process if the law had developed to give a preemptive effect
to the NLRB's jurisdiction to determine whether an unfair labor practice
had occurred. At one time there was a belief that Congress had entrusted the
NLRB with responsibility for development of a single, uniform, and cen-
trally administered system of labor law. This belief was so strong that the
Board was said to have an exclusive competence with respect to activities
arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.35 The law did not continue to develop that way, perhaps because of a
weakening conviction that all problems affecting employment would be
resolved by promoting the process of collective bargaining. New constitu-
encies developed, and employees could no longer be viewed simplistically
as either organized or unorganized. Persons seeking protection from racial
discrimination, sex discrimination, age discrimination, etc., formed sepa-
rate organizations. These organizations frequently viewed labor unions
with hostility because of their complicity in the discriminatory practices
that were to be challenged. Employees in these organzations did not want
the responsibility for vindicating their diverse interests assigned to one
centralized labor agency The assignments, therefore, were made instead to
the newly created agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, or older agencies which had not been intimately involved
with the collective bargaining process, such as the Wage and Hour Admin-
istrator of the Department of Labor. Those agencies, following the predicta-
ble process of administrative growth, developed independent programs for
accomplishment of the missions as defined in their statutory authorizations.
More to the point, it was established that conduct which might be an
unfair labor practice could also be the subject of a suit for violation of a
collective bargaining agreement, 36 the subject of an arbitration proceed-
ing,37 or a suit against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation. 38
The NLRB no longer enjoyed an assured primacy with respect to develop-
ment of labor policy for the nation. The complications grew with recogni-
tion of the NLRB's jurisdiction to interpret collective bargaining agree-
ments in resolving unfair labor practices, even though it was clear that
Congress had not intended to confer upon the Board a general jurisdiction
to decide claims for breach of contract. 39 The Board asserted this jurisdic-
35. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
36. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196-97 (1962).
37. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). Cf.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
38. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
39. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp. 385 U.S. 421,426-27 (1967); see also Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
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tion despite the presence of an arbitration clause broad enough to permit
consideration of whether the alleged unfair labor practice was a breach of
contract. 4
0
Another source of difficulty in establishing the appropriate relationship
between the NLRB and the arbitration process is the unsettled and uncer-
tain status of that process itself. The Supreme Court's decisions in the
Steelworkers Trilogy4' did successfully sluice an enormous number of
cases from the courts to arbitrators, but did so on terms that do not ensure
consistency and uniformity of results. Arbitrators are not required to apply
the law that courts would apply.42 The proper approach of courts to arbitra-
tion awards is to refuse to review the merits of dispute; mere ambiguities in
an opinion accompanying an award are not basis for setting the award
aside.43 Generally, courts are unwilling to require an arbitrator to recognize
a decision in a prior arbitration as a controlling precedent. 44 A consequence
is a perception that arbitrators do not follow prior decisions in cases arising
between the same parties on the same or a similar issue, even though there
are a considerable number of cases in which arbitrators have given controll-
ing effect to a prior award.45 This perceived lawlessness of arbitration is a
40. C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
41. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
42. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598-99.
43. Id. at 596, 598.
44. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764-66 (1983); IBEW Local 199 v.
United Tel. Co., 738 F.2d 1564 (lth Cir. 1984); Little Six Corp. v. Mine Workers Local 8332, 701 F2d
26, 27-28 (4th Cir. 1983); Butler Armco Indep. Union v. Armco, Inc., 701 E2d 253, 255-56 (3rd Cir.
1983); Boston Shipping Ass'n, Inc., v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.
1981); New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980), affd
sub. nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702
(1982); Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 578 F2d 250, 251 (9th Cir. 1978);
Westinghouse Elevators v. S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, 583 E2d 1184 (1st Cir. 1978); United Elec. Radio &
Machine Workers v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F2d 1221, 1228 (7th Cir. 1975); Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Atlantic Independent Union, 537 F. Supp. 371, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Typographical Workers Union v.
Bulletin Co., 484 E Supp. 1164, 1165 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Machinists v. Associated Trans., Inc., 92
L.R.R.M. 2342,2344 (D.N.C. 1976); Michigan Shippers v. Local 299, Teamsters, 61 L.R.R.M. 2466,
2469 (E.D. Mich. 1966). But see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Local No. 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1981), later app., 703 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1983); IBEW Local 199 v. United Tel. Co..
112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2666, 2668 (D. Fla. 1982); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine &
Ship Bldg. Workers, 242 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1965).
45. E.g., Detroit Edison Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565, 568-69 (1979) (Lipson, Arb.); Board of
Educ. of Cook County, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 310, 313-14 (1979) (Hill, Arb.); Bofors-Lakeway, Inc., 72
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 159, 161-62 (1979) (Kelman, Arb.); General Tel. Co. of Ohio, 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
240, 244-45 (1978) (Ellmann, Arb.); Todd Shipyards Corp., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27 (1977) (Jones,
Arb.); Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 157, 158 (1974) (High, Arb.); Mallinckrodt
Chem. Works, 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 933, 935-36 (Goldberg, Arb.); Board of Educ., City of New York,
45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 43, 46 (1965) (Rock, Arb.); Braun Baking Co., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 433, 440-41
(1964) (May, Arb.); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 567, 574 (1962) (Gillingham, Arb.);
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barrier to acceptance of an award- as an amplification of the agreement
between the parties, or an agreed upon completion of the negotiation
process that eliminates an ambiguity left in the agreement after the actual
negotiations. It also facilitates the NLRB's dismissal of an arbitration as
merely the view of another (and inferior) tribunal about the meaning to be
given contractual language.
The Board has also found reason to assert its unfair labor practice
jurisdiction because many, though not all, arbitrators accept a reserved
management rights view of collective bargaining which preserves for
management all those powers which are not specifically limited by the
agreement. 46 A consequence of that acceptance is that an employer is
permitted to take unilateral action affecting terms and conditions of employ-
ment unless restrained by the statutory obligation to bargain with the union.
The Board attempted to limit this opportunity for employer unilateral action
by holding that (1) a contractual waiver of a union's right to bargain must be
clear and unequivocal; or (2) there must be clear and unmistakable evidence
that the union consciously intended to waive its right to bargain about a
specific subject.47 This led to rejection of arbitrator's views of what the
parties had agreed upon.
The Supreme Court's decision last year in Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
NLRB 48 gives support to the NLRB's view that awards of arbitrators are
merely relevant and not controlling with respect to determining the mean-
ing of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court referred approvingly to
Brewers Bd. of Trade, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 679, 679-80 (1962) (Turkus, Arb.); Tennessee Coal,
Iron & Railroad, 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 426, 429 (1945). See . ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 21, at
377; see also Washington Hosp. v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 442 ESupp. 93,
95 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
46. Killingsworth, The Presidential Address: Management Rights Revisited, in ARBITRATION AND
SOCIAL CHANGE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1969); Phelps, Management's Reserved Rights: An Industry View, and Goldberg,
Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View, in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRAION
PROCESS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NNrH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS,
102, 118 (1956); . ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 21, at 412-19; see also Celanese Corp. of
America, 33 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 925,944 (1960) (Arbitrator C. Allan Dash, Jr., reported that a review of
64 published awards on the subject of contracting out indicated that only approximately one-third of the
arbitrators adopted a reserved rights theory, and even in those cases the arbitrators denied the merits of
the grievance).
47. Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953,956 (1958); Eaton, Yale & Towne,
Inc., Unit Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. 600,601(1968); Southern Materials Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 958,
960 (1970), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Southern Materials Co., 447 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1971); Bunker
Hill Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 27, 33 (1973), modified, 210 N.L.R.B. 343 (1974). A recent decision of the
Board, reconstituted by President Reagan's appointments, suggests that as with the "Nixon Board," the
requirements for establishing a waiver may be relaxed. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 270 N.L.R.B.
No. 95 (1984); see Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 362 (1974), supplementing 199 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1972);
Bancroft-Whitney Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 57 (1974).
48. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
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the requirement that a waiver of statutory right be clear and unmistakable. 49
It held that a union's failure to obtain a change in contract language after two
unfavorable arbitration awards did not establish a waiver of union officials'
protection against discipline for failure to act to achieve compliance with a
no-strike clause.50 The decision does not give the NLRB full freedom to
disregard arbitration awards because the Court specifically noted that they
may be relevant to establishing waiver of the statutory right.5' In the
Metropolitan Edison arbitration, however, the arbitrators had not specifi-
cally stated that the agreement clearly and unmistakably imposed a duty to
act on officials, 52 and the agreement contained a provision stating that an
award would be binding only for the term of that agreement. 53 It is,
nonetheless, anomalous that the decision was soon followed by the Board's
announcement of new policies of increased deferral to the arbitration
process.
The major source of the NLRB's deferral problem is the unsatisfactory
state of the law concerning the duty to bargain during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement. It is amazing that the leading case on the
subject is the Board's 1951 decision in Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 54 in
which the Board members expressed four different views of the problem.
The usually accepted reading of the opinions produces a rule that there is a
continuing duty to bargain about a subject that was neither discussed in
negotiations nor expressly covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
It relieves the parties from a duty to negotiate only about subjects that were
discussed in the negotiations or are expressly covered by a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement. 55 That rule does not fit well with the
practicalities of negotiation in which the acceptability of a proposed agree-
ment is determined not only by what is in the proposal but also by what is
not in it. A "deal" consists not only of what is given and taken, but of what
is not given or taken. Stylish new items, such as dental plans or vision
plans, are known to negotiators and their absence from a proposal will be
noted even though not mentioned. Moreover, parties discussing changes in
their relationship assume a continuation of the undiscussed portions of their
relationship and most certainly do not contemplate changes in undiscussed
matters which would destroy the acceptability of the proposed agreement.
49. Id. at 1477-78.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1467-68 n.13.
52. Id.
53. Id. 1472 n.5.
54. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, enforced, NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
55. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 458-61
(1976). The Board has required evidence that in the discussions the union clearly and unmistakably
waived its right to bargain about a specific subject. See supra note 47.
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The Jacobs rule that there is a continuing duty to bargain during the term
of an agreement provides a basis for continued involvement of the NLRB
with the contractual relationship between the parties even though they have
negotiated in good faith and reached an agreement which has its own
dispute resolution procedures. This involvement fits uncomfortably with
the well-established proposition that Congress did not intend the NLRB to
serve as a forum in which suits might be brought for breach of contract. 56 As
previously noted, the Board's rule requiring a clear and unmistakable
waiver of the duty to bargain further enlarges the possibility of conflict and
permits the Board to reject conclusions reached by arbitrators about the
relationship between the parties. 57
Another criticism of the Jacobs rule arises from the uncertainty that
remains concerning the propriety of a strike after an impasse has occurred in
the negotiations concerning a new and previously undiscussed subject. A
broad and comprehensive no-strike clause in the agreement may settle the
matter by a prohibition of all strikes for any purpose, but the teaching of the
Supreme Court's decision in Mastro Plastics58 is that very clear and explicit
language will be required to accomplish that result. Absent such a clause,
the statutory answer is uncertain.
Section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 194759 provides
that where a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, "no party to such
contract shall. . . modify such contract" unless that party serves written
notice on the other party and "continues in full force and effect, without
56. During consideration of the legislation that became the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Con-
ference Committee eliminated provisions which would have made it an unfair labor practice for a party
to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Senator Taft explained that the provisions were
eliminated because of objections to making the meaning of every collective bargaining agreement
subject to determination by the Board rather than the courts. 93 Cong. Rec. 6608 (1947), reprinted in I
Legis. Hist. of L.M.R.A., at 1539. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421,426-28 (1967).
57. The decision approved by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S.
693 (1983), is illustrative. See also Bethlehem Steel Corp.,252 N.L.R.B. 982 (1980), affd. in part,
enforcement deniedsub. nom. Foumelle v. NLRB, 670 E2d 331, 342 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (an instance
in which the NLRB and its administrative law judge ignored an arbitration award).
58. 350 U.S. 270 (1956). The no-strike provision in Mastro Plastics read,
5. The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement, there shall be no interference of any
kind with the operations of the Employers, or any interruptions or slackening of production of work
by any of its members. The Union ftuher agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike or work
stoppage during the term of this agreement.
Id. at 281. The provision was held not to prohibit a strike to protest serious unfair labor practices. Id. at
284. Cf. Arlan's Dep't Store of Michigan, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 802, 807 (1961). The Board has held that a
strike to protest unlawful unilateral action of an employer violated a no-strike provision because the
employer's unfair labor practice was not sufficiently serious to threaten the bargaining relationship. Dow
Chemical Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 333 (1974). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed, and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the employer's failure to seek a Boys Markets
injunction and attempt to arbitrate the dispute. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 530 E2d 266 (3d Cir.
1976).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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resorting to strike or lockout, all terms and conditions of the existing
contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the
expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later." The section also
provides that the duties imposed, "shall not be construed as requiring either
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become
effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the
provisions of the contract."
If, pursuant to Jacobs, there is a duty to bargain about new and previously
undiscussed subjects during the term of a contract, their addition to the
agreement would appear not to be a modification of the terms and condi-
tions contained in the contract within the meaning of that exception from
the duty to bargain. From this, it would follow that the addition of new and
previously undiscussed matters would not "modify" the contract in a
manner requiring written notice, unless the word "modify" in the first part
of section 8(d) has a meaning different from "modification of the terms and
conditions contained in a contract" in the latter part of that section. If no
notice is required, the prohibition against strikes for sixty days after notice
would be inapplicable. But even if notice is required, that requirement
would prohibit a strike for only 60 days after notice was given. The only
remaining statutory prohibition against a strike over a new and previously
undiscussed subject would be the prohibition against strikes until the
expiration date of the contract.
If, contrary to what Jacobs suggests, a party seeking to add a new and
previously undiscussed subject is seeking to "modify" the contract within
the meaning of section 8(d), the prohibition against "resorting to strike"
prior to the termination of the contract appears applicable on a literal
reading of that section. However, the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Lion Oil Co.60 suggests that a literal reading be rejected. In that case, the
Court held that section 8(d) was not violated by a strike occurring before a
contract had terminated when that strike occurred during the reopening of
the contract after notice and pursuant to a reopening provision in the
contract. In so holding, the Court said, "It would be anomalous for Con-
gress to recognize such a duty [to bargain] and at the same time deprive the
union of the strike threat which, together with 'the occasional strike itself,
is the force depended upon to facilitate arriving at satisfactory settle-
ments.-' 6 1 That observation appears applicable to bargaining about new
and previously undiscussed subjects of bargaining if Congress did intend
by section 8(d) that there be a duty to bargain about such subjects.
60. 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
61. Id. at 291 (footnote omitted).
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There are but a few cases dealing with the legality of strikes during the
term of a collective bargaining agreement over new and previously
undiscussed subjects, and they do not clearly answer the question about
their legality.62 Perhaps this is because unions accept the package concept of
negotiation and believe that it would reflect adversely on their good faith or
ethics if economic weapons were used during the term of an existing
agreement for the purpose of obtaining new and additional concessions.
Nevertheless, the Jacobs rule creates this potential for legal strikes in
support of new bargaining demands during the term of a collective bargain-
ing agreement. This potential subverts section 8(d)'s evident purpose of
obtaining stability and labor peace.
The question of whether a term or condition is contained in a collective
bargaining agreement comes before the NLRB more frequently in cases in
which an employer has taken unilateral action, contending that it was
authorized, or not prohibited, by the agreement. 63 In these cases the
employer, charged with a violation of its duty to bargain, frequently
suggests deferral to the arbitration process. If deferral was not practiced, the
Board in the past was likely to apply its rule requiring a clear and
unmistakable waiver of the duty to bargain and conclude that the employer
has violated its duty to bargain. 64 The remedial order, directing the
employer to bargain with the union about the matter on which it has taken
62. United Mine Workers, Local 9735, v. NLRB, 258 E2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958) involved a strike to
obtain shift seniority at a mine after an arbitrator's decision that arrangements for such seniority had not
been made, although they were permitted by the National Agreement. A majority of the court held that
the strike was to obtain that seniority, not to modify the agreement, and therefore did not violate Section
8(d). Judge Burger dissented, arguing that the award had become a part of the agreement. 258 E2d at
149-51. The decision has been cited with approval in related contexts by other courts. General Elec. Co.
v. NLRB, 443 F2d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Deaton Truck Line, Inc., 389 F.2d 163,170 (5th
Ci 1968); Trailways of New England v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Railway and Motor Coach
Employees, 343 E2d 815, 818 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). However, another
court, rejecting the NLRB's argument to the contrary, indicated that Section 8(d) should be construed to
preclude all strikes during the term of an agreement. Local 3, United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB,
210 F2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822 (1954). For cases holding that it is a violation of
Section 8(d) to strike without notice in protest of an employer's refusal to bargain, see Puerto Rico Junior
College, 265 N.L.R.B. 72 (1982); Local 156, United Packinghouse Workers, 117 N.L.R.B. 670 (1957).
See also R. GORMAN, supra note 55, at 462-63 (1976); Wollett, The Duty to Bargain Over the
"Unwritten" Terms and Conditions of Employment, 36 TEx. L. REv. 863, 873-76 (1958).
63. E.g., NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Bunker Hill Co., 208 N.L.R.B.
27, modified, 210 N.L.R.B. 343 (1974).
64. Tocco Div. of Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., v. NLRB, 702 E2d 624 (6th Cir. 1983); Island
Typographers, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 9 (1980), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Island Typographers, Inc.,
705 E2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983); Aeronca, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 261 (1980), enforcement denied, Aeronca,
Inc. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1981); International Woodworkers Local 3-10 v. NLRB, 380 R2d
628 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Western Foundries, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1033 (1977); Bunker Hill Co., 208




unilateral action, initially appears to support the union's position. Par-
ticularly is this so if the order requires reimbursement of any economic
losses suffered by employees because of the unilateral action. In general,
however, a union's opportunity to bargain on a new and previously
undiscussed subject with an employer that proposed such negotiations will
be greatly diminished in value by the uncertainty of whether a strike after
impasse would violate section 8(d). If it did, strikers would not have the
protection of the Act. 65 Even if the conclusion is that a strike would not
violate section 8(d), the cost to employees of strike action may be entirely
disproportionate to what is at stake on a single issue on which the employer
has taken unilateral action. The union would be in a better position if
unilateral actions affecting wages, terms, and conditions of employment
were not permitted and neither party could insist upon negotiations on a
new and previously undiscussed subject. Employers would also be pro-
tected from demands for new benefits.
Such a rule for the duty to bargain during the term of an agreement was
proposed in 1950 by authorities as eminent as Professors Cox and Dunlop. 66
Their proposal became the basis for Member Reynolds' dissent in Jacobs
Manufacturing Co., 67 but it did not prevail at the Board nor has it found
support in the courts. It has, however, received support from some commen-
tators.6 8 In his text on labor law published in 1976, Professor Gorman
indicated that the proposal has continued viability by setting out Member
Reynolds' view. 69 Given the expected reopening of the question of NLRB
deferral to the arbitration process, the proposal deserves reconsideration.
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO DEFERRAL PROBLEMS
Basic to the proposal is the concept that, unless a contrary understanding
is expressly stated, a collective bargaining agreement should be deemed to
65. Section 8(d) specifically provides "Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice
period specified in this subsection. . . shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in
the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of [sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1982).
66. Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term OfAn Existing Agreement,
63 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1950).
67. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1231 n.36 (1951).
68. 1 made a proposal based upon the Cox and Dunlop article in a paper presented in 1969 at the
Southwestern Legal Foundation. Peck, Accommodation and Conflict Among Tribunals: Whatever
Happened to Preemption?, 15 LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 121, 151-61 (1969). Professor Hanley made a
similar proposal the year before. Hanley, The NLRB and the Arbitration Process: Conflict or Accom-
modation? 14 LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 151 (1968). Professor Christensen has given a partial
endorsement. Christensen, supra note 6, at 79.
69. R. GORMAN, supra note 55, at 460-61. The basic argument is restated in A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, LABOR LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 659 (1981).
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carry forward for its duration the prevailing terms and conditions of employ-
ment even though they are not expressly stated in the contract. The concept
is in accord with the practicalities of the negotiation process, in which the
acceptability of a proposed contract is determined not only by what it
contains but also by what it does not contain. This does not mean that every
aspect of employment is frozen as though there had been cast over the work
establishment a spell as potent as that which brought an end to activity in the
palace of Sleeping Beauty. A dynamic view of the employment relationship
produces an understanding that procedures may exist for determining how
newly hired employees work out a labor pool, bid for and receive promo-
tions to better jobs, how piece rates or incentive pay adjustments are made,
or that, depending upon seasonal factors or changes in business, the
employer determines how many shifts will be scheduled and the time at
which they begin. As Cox and Dunlop put it:
Thus, at any given time the status quo is made up of (a) the modes of
procedure followed in making decisions concerning matters subject to contin-
uous review and (b) the basic substantive terms and conditions of employment
which are changed only upon annual or biennial review.70
Some matters, such as the products to be made and the prices at which they
will be sold, may have an effect upon employment but they are generally
understood by the parties to be matters to be decided, without regard to the
frequency of such decisions, by management. (Moreover, the Supreme
Court and the NLRB are currently removing those matters from the area of
mandatory bargaining despite their effects upon employment. 71) The Cox
and Dunlop proposal does, however, involve rejection of the reserved
management rights theory and imposes limitations on management action
affecting wages and terms or conditions of employment even though those
limitations are not expressly stated in the collective bargaining agreement.
If a collective bargaining agreement is deemed to carry forward for its
duration the prevailing terms and conditions of employment, whether
mentioned in the agreement or not, unilateral action with respect to a term
or condition of employment would constitute a modification of the agree-
ment, and hence a violation of section 8(d), unless that action was autho-
rized by the agreement. Moreover, a proposal that such a change be made
would be a proposal ihat the agreement be modified, and hence, pursuant to
section 8(d), the duty to bargain would not require the other party to discuss
or agree to the proposal.
70. Cox and Dunlop, supra note 66, at 1118-19.
71. E.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); United Technologies, 269
N.L.R.B. No. 162 (1984).
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Cox and Dunlop argued, 72 and it has since been authoritatively estab-
lished, 73 that the duty to bargain applies to administration of a collective
bargaining agreeement and the processing of grievances during the term of
the agreement. Cox and Dunlop also argued that during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement an offer to follow the contract grievance
procedure satisfies any duty to bargain collectively with respect to a matter
to which the procedures may apply 74 That formulation leads to the con-
clusion that the duty to bargain has been fulfilled by a good faith offer to
follow a grievance and arbitration procedure even though ultimately an
arbitrator decides that the procedure was inapplicable. An arbitrator might
reach such a conclusion either on procedural grounds or because the
grievance procedure of the agreement limited an arbitrator's jurisdiction to
determining the meaning and application of the agreement and the
arbitrator concluded the dispute was not expressly or by implication cov-
ered by the agreement.
This result produces an unacceptable difficulty because of the six month
limitation period for the filing of unfair labor practice charges established
by section 10(b). 75 Unless there is an unusually speedy arbitration proceed-
ing to challenge the unilateral action taken, more than six months will have
passed from the time the action was taken until the award issued. Continued
adherence to the practice unilaterally established after it was decided the
grievance procedure did not apply to the dispute could be considered a
violation of the duty to bargain. However, such an approach to the problem
is unsatisfactory because the Board would be unable to provide a remedy for
losses suffered prior to the award when no unfair labor practice was
occurring.
The complete remedy is available, however, if, given a finding that an
unfair labor practice was committed, it is also found to have occurred at the
time the unilateral action was taken. The question of whether that unilateral
action was an unfair labor practice may be determined later, when the
arbitrator decides whether or not the grievance and arbitration procedure
was applicable to the dispute created by the unilateral action. Awaiting the
arbitrator's decision requires a stay of proceedings on a charge filed within
six months after the action was taken. The problem is administrative or
procedural, involving timing and scheduling of hearings, and not one of the
substantive law of collective bargaining. Comparable problems with stat-
utes of limitations have been handled by stays of proceedings in other areas
of substantive law: e.g., a suit for personal injuries may be instituted but
72. Cox and Dunlop, supra note 66, at 1099-1101.
73. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).
74. Cox and Dunlop, supra note 66, at 1101-07.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
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continued to permit determination of the full extent of injuries, 76 or a
prosecutor may delay obtaining an indictment or issuing an information for
a year and a day after a grievous assault to determine whether death
occurring in that period makes the crime a homicide. 77
If the party charged with a violation of the duty to bargain is willing to
arbitrate and the arbitrator decides that the challenged action was autho-
rized, it should be held that the duty to bargain has been discharged. 78 The
76. The longer period of the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions permits
delay in the filing of such suits. Moreover, it is frequently in the interest of both parties to permit
determination of the full extent of injuries, and motions for continuances are not likely to be opposed. If
such a suit is filed and a requested continuance opposed, the matter falls within the sound discretion of
the trial judge. C. WRIGHT & A. M.LER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2352 (1971). Accord-
ingly, the practice has not been the subject of reported appellate decisions. Moreover, Rule 27 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and its counterparts in state rules of civil procedure, permit the taking
of depositions for the purpose of perpetuating testimony, making it possible to withhold the filing of suit
in cases in which death penalty is a possibility. See Mosseller v. United States, 158 F2d 380 (2d Cir.
1946).
77. Cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); State v. Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, 102 P.2d
913 (1940); see also Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REv. 525,
527 n.ll (1975).
78. This was the holding of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Liquor Salesmen's Union Local
2 v. NLRB, 664 F2d 318 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. Charmer
Indus., Inc., 456 U.S. 973 (1982). The court pointed out that an employer's change of procedures for
handling C.O.D. deliveries and payments did not constitute a change in the rules or working conditions,
and hence there was no duty to bargain. 664 E2d at 325.
A pre-Taft-Hartley Act decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an employer's
duty to bargain can be channeled into a grievance and arbitration procedure, with a consequence that the
duty to bargain was not violated by refusal to discuss those grievances so long as a strike continued.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 1947). Early Board decisions
supported the proposition that the duty to bargain can be channeled into the grievance and arbitration
procedures established by a collective bargaining agreement. Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47
N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enforced as modified, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944); Crown Zellerbach Corp. 95
N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); Textron Puerto Rico (Tricot Div.), 107 N.L.R.B. 583 (1953); McDonnell Aircraft
Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954); United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); National Dairy Prod.
Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 434 (1960). See Peck, supra note 68, at 138-39.
The development was arrested by the decision in Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B.
1410 (1964), in which the Board rejected an employer's defense that a charge of unlawful unilateral
action should be dismissed because the union had not used the grievance and arbitration procedures of
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1416. It was revived temporarily by the decision in Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969), in which the Board dismissed in its entirety a complaint
of unilateral action because the union failed to respond to the employers good faith suggestion that the
dispute be resolved in the grievance and arbitration procedures of their agreement. Id. at 142. The
development was then transformed by the Collyer decision, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), into a principle of
deferral rather than a recognition of a defense on the merits.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that arbitration concerning the propriety or
fairness of an employer's policy after it has been put into effect was not a substitute for the bargaining
required by the Act. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1978). The arbitration
awards to which the Board refused to defer in that case appear to have been based on a reserved
management rights theory of collective bargaining. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757, 757
(1977). They would not serve to discharge the duty to bargain under the proposal here advanced. See
supra text following note 71.
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only question remaining for the Board should be whether the contract as
interpreted by the arbitrator violates any provision of the Act other than the
duty to bargain: e.g., is the agreement, as construed by the arbitrator, lawful
if it permits an employer to subcontract certain work or to adjust incentive
pay rates? 79 The arbitrator is the reader of the contract, chosen by the
parties, 80 and his decision should be authoritative and controlling con-
cerning the meaning to be given contract language because the parties
provided that arbitration was the method to be used to resolve disputes
about their agreement. There is no occasion for the Board to substitute its
reading of the contract for that of the arbitrator and find that it did not
authorize action which the arbitrator found it had authorized. Therefore,
there is no occasion for the Board to defer to the arbitration process.
Likewise, if the arbitrator decides that the challenged action violated the
collective bargaining agreement and the party taking that action complies
with the award, remedying its breach in the manner prescribed by the
arbitrator, no violation of the duty to bargain should be found. The action,
though erroneous, was taken in good faith and subject to revision by an
agreed-upon procedure. It was not a rejection of the obligation to bargain
with the other party to the relationship; it was merely a breach of contract,
and the Board was not charged with the responsibility for removing
breaches of contract. 81 Again, there is no occasion for the Board to defer to
the arbitration process.
If the arbitrator concludes that the dispute was not subject to the griev-
ance and arbitration procedure, an unfair labor practice may have been
committed when the unilateral action was taken. Whether or not it did will
turn upon whether it was a change in the substantive terms and conditions of
employment prevailing at the time the agreement was made; or whether it
was a change of the sort permitted by the procedures then existing for
making decisions concerning matters subject to continuous review. If it was
the former, the action constituted a modification of the contract in violation
of section 8(d). That question is to be resolved by the NLRB in the exercise
of its powers to prevent unfair labor practices, and presents no occasion for
deferral to the arbitration process.
Problems will arise in determining whether the arbitrator's decision
denying a grievance was based upon a conclusion that the disputed action
was authorized by the agreement or whether the arbitrator accepted the
79. But cf Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 48-53).
80. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel
and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1977). The arbitrator's authoritative reading of the
contract makes it unnecessary to consider whether a statutory right has been waived with sufficient
clarity.
81. Supra note 56.
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theory of reserved management rights and the conclusion was that the
agreement had not specifically limited the employer's authority. The prob-
lems will be complicated when the agreement contains a management's
rights clause and the arbitrator relies upon both the presence of the clause
and the reserved management rights theory. The NLRB should bear respon-
sibility for solving these problems in the course of determining whether an
unfair labor practice has been committed. If it concludes that the arbitrator's
decision was based upon a reading of the management's rights clause, the
question remaining is not that of whether to defer, but whether such a clause
is unlawful. As a generalization, management's rights clauses are not
illegal.82 Unions may upon occasion have been willing to accept them
because of the Board's insistence upon language clearly and unequivocally
waiving the right to bargain, but recent developments by a reconstituted
Board suggest that such reliance by unions is unwise.83 Unions may
properly be bound for the term of an agreement to the meaning which their
chosen "reader" gave that agreement. They should not be bound, however,
solely by the arbitrator's view of collective bargaining that employers retain
all rights not specifically limited by the agreement.
Discussions between the General Counsel's representatives and the
charged party provide the suitable occasion for determining whether the
grievance and arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement is
broad enough to cover the dispute. Decision at the Board level comes too
late, and in fact most decisions on deferral are now made at the level of the
regional office.84 If the provision is broad enough to cover the dispute and
the charged party is willing to arbitrate, an incentive to obtain a clear
statement as to whether the action was authorized by the agreement could
be provided by requiring for the ultimate dismissal of the charge that the
arbitrator's decision and award include findings or conclusions that the
action taken was so authorized. The charged party will seek such a decision
and award rather than one resting on the reserved rights of management
theory of collective bargaining. If a complaint issues, the charged party will
obtain review of the decision concerning the basis of the arbitrator's
decision and award. If the General Counsel's representative decides that-the
action was found to be authorized by the agreement, he will dismiss the
charge, with a consequence that the charging party may obtain no review.
That, however, is the current situation for parties whose charges are subject
to the present deferral policy.85
82. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 405 (1952).
83. E.g., Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1984) ("Zipper" clause is a clear
and unmistakable waiver of a union's right to bargain over the elimination of a Christmas bonus that the
employer had given for forty years).
84. See infra note 95.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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The NLRB should continue to give support to the arbitration process
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, as in NLRB v.
Acme Industrial Co., 86 the Board may aid the arbitration process by
providing compulsory process similar to subpoenas and discovery mecha-
nisms without interfering with the arbitration process. As the Court noted in
that case, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction in no way threatened the
power that the parties had given the arbitrator to make binding interpreta-
tions of the labor agreement. 87 The Board might go further without threat-
ening the power the parties gave the arbitrator and find violations of the duty
to bargain when a party refuses to arbitrate, is dilatory about arbitration, or
refuses to comply with an award. 88
What has been proposed is supported by the provision found in section
203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act concerning arbitration.
That section provides:
(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. 89
As the italics emphasize, arbitration is "the" preferred method for resolving
disputes concerning the application or interpretation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. It is not merely "a" preferred method or a "tolerated"
method for resolving such disputes. If it is the preferred method, its product
should be preferred to that of the NLRB whenever the question is one of
meaning and application of a collective bargaining agreement. Arbitration
is given no such preference for the resolution of other types of disputes
which involve unfair labor practices.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CURRENT BOARD DEFERRAL POLICY
The Supreme Court has in several decisions made approving references
to the NLRB's policy of deferring to the arbitration process, 90 but those
expressions of approval give little insight as to whether the Court would
approve specific aspects of that policy in its varied evolutionary stages. The
86. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
87. Id. at 438.
88. To the contrary, the Board has held that a refusal to arbitrate is not a violation of the duty to
bargain. Sucesion Mario Mercado e Hijos, 161 N.L.R.B. 696, 700 (1966). The holding seems
inconsistent with the recognition that the duty to bargain extends to administration of a collective
bargaining agreement. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
90. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1515 (1984); William E. Arnold Co. v.
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courts of appeal have been almost unanimous in holding that the NLRB has
a wide discretion concerning deferral to the arbitration process.91 Some
courts have suggested that the discretion is limited by a requirement that the
Board announce and follow its policies until such time as they are changed
through formal rulemaking or adjudication.92 However, three courts of
appeals 93 have stated a disagreement on the merits with the Board's former
Electronic Reproduction rule.94 As stated at the outset, judicial challenges
to the Board's most recent revision of its deferral policies may be predicted
with confidence. The cases in which such challenges are made will fall into
the two categories developed in the Board's evolution of its policies: (1)
cases in which the question involves the effect to be given in a pending
unfair labor practice proceeding to a previously issued arbitration award,
and (2) cases in which the question is whether the Board's processes should
be stayed pending the completion of an arbitration proceeding that may
resolve the dispute.
There are substantial barriers to obtaining judicial review in both catego-
ries of cases. When the Board's processes are stayed, that stay is almost
always accomplished at the regional level by a decision to withhold the
issuance of a complaint on the charge filed. 95 The same is true of dismissals
91. NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Designcraft Jewel
Indus., Inc., 675 F.2d 493,495-96 (2nd Cir. 1982); Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 E2d 669, 674 (9th Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1980); Stephenson v. NLRB,
550 F2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1977).
92. NLRB v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 E2d 734, 736 (4th Cir. 1982); Designcraft Jewel Indus.,
Inc., 675 F2d 493,495 (2d Cir. 1982); St. Luke's Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 623 F2d 1173, 1178
(7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Horn &Hardart Co., 439 E2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971);see also NLRB v. Wolf
& Munier, Inc., 747 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1984) (remanding acaseto the Board for determination of whether
a joint conference committee's decision in a grievance proceeding was a resolution of the statutory issue
of the employee's supervisory status).
93. NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 1983); Stephenson v. NLRB, 550
F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1977); Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For decisions
approving the Board's decision in Suburban Motor Freight, placing the burden on the party seeking
deferral to prove the unfair labor practice was litigated before the arbitrator, see NLRB v. Designcraft
Jewel Indus., Inc., 675 E2d 493 (2d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 R2d 943 (3d
Cir. 1981); Pioneer Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 667 F2d 199 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080
(1983); St. Luke's Memorial Hosp., Inc., v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1980); see also NLRB v.
Motor Convoy, Inc., 673 E2d 734 (4th Cir. 1982) (requiring deferral to an award that did not expressly
resolve the unfair labor practice charge because resolution of the contractual dispute necessarily
resolved the unfair labor practice question).
94. The rule provided for deferral in a discipline or discharge case even though it appeared that
evidence on the unfair labor practice was not presented to or considered by the arbitrator. Electric
Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
95. Board member Zimmerman, in his dissenting opinion in Olin Corp., cited agency statistics
indicating that between October 1, 1981, and the end of December 1983, in excess of 3800 cases had
been deferred pursuant to Collyer and Dubo standards. During the same period in only 163 previously
deferred cases did the General Counsel issue complaints pursuant to Suburban Motor Freight and
Spielberg standards. Over 1700 previously deferred cases were dismissed, withdrawn, or settled. Olin
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, at 25, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1064 (1984).
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of charges because of prior arbitration awards. The decision of the General
Counsel (and his representatives) not to issue a complaint is generally said
to be unreviewable. 96 In addition, there are the statements of courts of
appeals that the NLRB has a broad discretion concerning deferral to
arbitration awards. 97 Thus, a challenge to a refusal to issue a complaint
upon the basis of the Board's recent decision in United Technologies will
involve the difficulties of an attack upon two discretionary determinations.
However, the principal reason for recognizing an unreviewable discretion of
the General Counsel is to avoid judicial supervision of the day to day
issuance of complaints and the attendant appraisal of the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify that action.98 That reason carries no weight when the
challenge is to the general policy of United Technologies, which has been
accepted by and incorporated in the General Counsel's memorandum to
regional directors. 99 His acceptance of the rule announced in United Tech-
nologies makes it apparent that decisions to defer to the arbitration process
will not be the product of an exercise of his discretion, but instead his
acceptance of a rule announced in a Board decision of an unfair labor
practice case, which would have been subject to judicial review to deter-
mine its validity. Moreover, unless judicial review of that policy is granted,
the General Counsel will administer a significant portion of the "law in
action" to persons filing unfair labor practice charges without a judicial
determination of the validity of that policy
Some assistance with the problem may be gained from a brief review of a
similar problem arising from the general proposition that Board decisions
in representation cases are generally not subject to direct judicial review in
federal district courts. 100 (The absence of such review serves an apparent
Congressional purpose of avoiding delays in the establishment of collective
bargaining relationships, manifested by provision in the Act only for review
of Board decisions in unfair labor practice cases.) For many years the Board
exercised discretion concerning the volume of business required in deter-
mining whether it would effectuate the policies of the Act to assert its
jurisdiction in particular cases. However, judicial review was granted and
the Supreme Court disapproved of the Board's general policy of refusing to
assert jurisdiction over labor unions as employers with respect to their own
employees. 101 Likewise, the judicial review was granted and the Supreme
96. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d
776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
97. See supra note 91.
98. United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966).
99. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
100. American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). Cf Switchmen's Union v. National
Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
101. Office Employees Int'l Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957). The NLRB had
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Court disapproved of the Board's general policy of refusing to assert
jurisdiction over employers in the hotel industry. 102 These decisions were
extensions of the Supreme Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne, 103 in which
the Court struck down Board action that it characterized as in excess of its
delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act. 10 4
Perhaps, as Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit argued, 10 5 the Board's
assertion of authority to determine when complaints should proceed to
hearing is in conflict with the "final authority" conferred by section 3(d) on
the General Counsel over the issuance of complaints. This assertion may
also be inconsistent with the express, but limited, provision for deferral to
arbitration found in section 10(k) of the Act with respect to jurisdictional
disputes. 106 If so, it could be subject to judicial review pursuant to Leedom
v. Kyne. Even if that conflict does not exist and the policy concerning
issuance of complaints is considered discretionary, courts might order the
General Counsel to re-exercise his discretionary power upon a correct view
of the law, much in the same manner as the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion long ago was directed to proceed with a case it had erroneously
concluded was not within its jurisdiction. 07 The language of section 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act would support such an order in a chal-
lenge to the legality of the Board's deferral policies. It provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law. . . .The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed
108
dismissed complaint issued on unfair labor practice charges, making possible review under the
provisions of the Act.
102. Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958). This case began as a suit in a
federal district court after a regional director had dismissed a petition for a representation election on the
basis of previously announced jurisdictional standards. Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 147
ESupp. 306 (D.D.C. 1957), af'd, 249 E2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
103. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
104. Id. at 188.
105. NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 E2d 367, 385 (3d Cir. 1980). A similar controversy
over whether the Board or the General Counsel should determine what level of interstate commerce
justified the issuance of a complaint was ultimately resolved in favor of the Board. Haleston Drug
Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 E2d418 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342U.S. 815 (1951); seeNote, The Taft-
Hartley Act, 64 HARv. L. REv. 781 (1951).
106. 620 E2d at 387.
107. ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912). For a more recent
case ofjudicial review of action committed to discretion and not merely ministerial, see Naporano Metal
& Iron Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 529 E2d 537 (3d Cir. 1976); see also 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 23.9-23.13 (2d ed. 1983).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). See also K. DAVis, supra note 107, at § 23.9. The Administrative
Procedure Act does not, however, provide an independent jurisdictional grant for judicial review.
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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THE PROPRIETY OF PRE-ARBITRAL DEFERRAL
On the merits, challenges to pre-arbitral deferral should succeed with
respect to most unfair labor practice charges. Section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act does underscore the importance of arbitration
in the national labor relations policy, but it declares arbitration to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes "arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment." Unless the existence of the unfair labor practice charged turns upon
the application or interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the
purpose of the section is not served by deferral. The Supreme Court's
decision in Lincoln Mills'0 9 concluded that agreements to arbitrate should
be enforceable to make collective bargaining agreements enforceable, not
for the purpose of preventing unfair labor practices violating sections
8(a)(1) and (3) or 8(b)(1)(A). The cases making up the Steelworkers
Trilogy" 10 and establishing arbitration as a "kingpin" of national labor
policy involved disputes concerning the meaning and application of terms
of collective bargaining agreements, and not charges of unfair labor prac-
tices.
Most frequently violations of section 8(a)(1) and (3) occur because of
employer opposition to unions and collective bargaining. It is therefore
important to remember that, despite some limiting language added by the
Taft-Hartley Act, the still declared policy of the United States is to eliminate
obstructions to commerce "by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of represen-
tatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." "1 It is
the NLRB, and not privately chosen arbitrators, that has been empowered
to prevent the commission of unfair labor practices, and thus pursue that
policy The policy statement indicates that, while the Board is to prevent
undesired practices of labor organizations, it is not to sit by passively
observing a conflict between employers and unions and the employees they
represent. The deferral policies recently announced with respect to charged
violations of sections 8(a)(1),(3) and 8(b)(1)(A) shift the costs of achieve-
ment of the policy from the Board to those whom the statutory provisions
109. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957).
110. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1983).
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were intended to protect. Those costs usually are substantial. 112 The con-
cept of a victim-financed enforcement of law is both so unusual and
offensive as to require its rejection without resort to a comparative evalua-
tion of the strengths and weaknesses of Board processes and the arbitration
process as means of preventing unfair labor practices. 113
Deferral-preferably described as a stay of proceedings-should be
permitted where it will permit the determination of whether the taking of
unilateral action constituted a violation of the duty to bargain. In such
cases, the stay should be recognized as the solution to a problem of
administration, scheduling, or procedure, and not considered a mysterious
matter of the relationship between unfair labor practice law and the arbitra-
tion process. The question is simply whether an unfair labor practice was
committed, and it may be answered by an arbitrator's decision. Recognizing
the propriety of a stay on this basis undercuts the argument for deferral on
other unfair labor practices. Unless the existence of the unfair labor practice
turns upon the meaning and application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment there is no need to get the arbitrator's authoritative reading of the
contract, even though the arbitrator might provide a remedy for an unfair
labor practice, as, for example, with a common sense conclusion that a
discharge motivated by anti-union considerations is not a discharge for just
cause.
Occasionally, whether a violation of section 8(a)(3) or (1) has occurred
may turn upon the meaning and application of a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement: e.g., does the no strike clause of the agreement
impose an obligation on union officials to prevent work stoppages or permit
the imposition of more severe discipline upon union officials who partici-
pate in a work stoppage? In some cases an arbitrator, or arbitrators, may
have already given an authoritative reading of the contract, in which case
the only question should be whether that reading violates provisions of the
Act or other applicable statutes. In other cases there may be no prior
112. In 1980, the average total cost for the services of an arbitrator reported to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service was $1,011.74. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILAT1ON SERVICE
Tstmnv-THnD ANNUAL REPoRr, FISCAL YEAR 1980 37 (1981). These costs are generally shared equally
by the parties. To these costs there must be added the expenses of each party which may exceed the total
fees and expenses of the arbitrator, particularly if the party is represented by an attorney.
113. Generally speaking, such an evaluation would give preference to the Board's processes. See
supra text and note 6. Arbitrators must maintain acceptability to both employers and unions if they are to
be selected for subsequent cases. An arbitrator's willingness to find a violation of a collective bargaining
agreement may affect his acceptability for similar cases. The condemnation of a party for having violated
basic statutory rights of employees much more likely casts the role of protagonist upon the arbitrator,
and thus has an even greater effect upon acceptability. Hopefully arbitrators would not allow this
consideration to affect their decisions, but the existence of the biasing possibility certainly works as a
disqualification for judging charges of statutory violations.
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interpretation of ambiguous language or consideration of past practices,
and arbitration of the dispute may provide the answer to whether or not an
unfair labor practice has been committed. In such a case a stay should be
permitted if the claimed reading is plausible and the defense offered in good
faith, even though it requires the charging party to bear a share of the
arbitration expenses. That party should not be permitted to circumvent the
agreed upon procedures for determining the meaning and application of
these collective bargaining agreements. If the charging party is an individ-
ual employee and the union refuses to arbitrate, the Board should be able to
proceed as it did in C & C Plywood 411 and determine the meaning of the
contract itself. Otherwise the matter should be recognized as the granting of
a stay for the purpose of determining whether an unfair labor practice was
committed.
THE PROPRIETY OF POST-ARBITRAL DEFERRAL
It is important to remember that most post-arbitral deferral decisions are
made in the regional offices, resulting in dismissals of charges, and do not
occur at the Board level in its decisions. 115 As a consequence, because of a
general acceptance that such decisions are not reviewable, most of those
decisions have not been subjected to judicial scrutiny However, some of the
cases decided by the Board have been subjected to judicial review by parties
arguing either that it was error to defer to the award or that it was error to
refuse to defer to the award. As mentioned above, 116 three courts of appeals
have disapproved of the rule announced in the Board's 1974 decision in
Electronic Reproduction Service. Four other courts of appeals 17 have
stated their approval of Suburban Motor Freight,118 which overruled
Electronic Reproduction. Nevertheless, in its recent decision in Olin
Corp. 119 the Board restored the policy it had pursued in Electronic Repro-
duction, making modifications in the formula by which that policy will be
pursued.
The modifications announced probably will not save the resuscitated
policy As mentioned above, the Electronic Reproduction rule required
114. Supra note 39. In some cases the Union's refusal to arbitrate may be a violation of its duty of
fair representation. See R. GORMAN, supra note 55, at 695-728 (1976).
115. See supra note 95. The Board itself deferred to prior arbitration awards in only 13 cases in the
period from 1977 to 1980; in the same period of time it did not defer to prior awards in 58 cases. The total
number of Spielberg deferral cases reaching the Board during that period was, therefore, only 71.
Comment, Judicial Review and the Trend Toward More Stringent NLRB Standards on Arbitral
Deferrals, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 738, 771 app. (1981).
116. Supra note 93.
117. See supra note 93.
118. Supra note 14.
119. Supra note 1.
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deferral even though the arbitrator had not passed on the unfair labor
practice issue, unless the party seeking to avoid deferral established bona
fide reasons, other than the desire to make possible trial in two forums, for
the failure to introduce evidence on the unfair labor practice at the arbitra-
tion hearing. Olin Corp. varies this formula by establishing for deferral a
requirement that the contractual issue before the arbitrator be "factually
parallel" to the unfair labor practice issue and that there have been a general
presentation to the arbitrator of the facts relevant to resolving the unfair
labor practice issue. However, the stringency of these standards for deferral
is effectively negated by placing the burden on the party seeking to avoid
deferral the obligation of showing that the standards for deferral had not
been met. This cannot be done merely by showing that the award is not
consistent with Board precedent. The award must be shown to be palpably
wrong-not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act. Thus,
deferral may occur simply because the General Counsel fails to prove what
did not happen at the arbitration hearing. 120
The recently announced formula offers so little assurance that the act has
not been violated that the courts probably will reject it for the same reason
they rejected the Electronic Reproduction standards. Prior to the Board's
decision in Electronic Reproduction, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia concluded that deferral was proper only where the resolution
of the contractual issues is congruent with the resolution of the statutory
issues; otherwise, it said, Board abstention would constitute not deferral but
abdication. 121 It therefore added to the Spielberg standards the prerequisites
that "the arbitral tribunal (A) clearly decided the issue on which it is later
urged that the Board should give deference, and (B) the arbitral tribunal
decided an issue within its competence."1 22 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, specifically rejecting the Electronic Reproduction rule, gave its
approval to the D.C. Circuit's decision, adding a definition of what the
"clearly decided" requirement means: "substantial and definite proof that
the unfair labor practice issue and evidence were expressly presented to the
arbitrator and the arbitrator's decision indisputably resolves that issue in a
manner entirely consistent with the Act."1 23 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit likewise gave its approval to the D.C. Circuit's decision' 24 and
after referring to the Ninth Circuit's amplification of the proof necessary for
120. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. In a recent, post Olin Corp. decision, the Board
accepted the testimony of an employer representative of an arbitration panel to establish what evidence
was presented at the arbitration hearing. Hilton Hotels Corp. dlb/a The Denver Hilton Hotel, 272
N.L.R.B. 4 (1984).
121. Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
122. Id. at 347.
123. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 E2d 535, 538 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977).
124. NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 E2d 806, 810-11 (6th Cir. 1983).
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deferral, stated that any doubts regarding the propriety of deferral would be
resolved against the party urging deferral. 125 The Olin Corp. formula for
allocating the burden of proof is, of course, directly in conflict with the
Sixth Circuit's treatment of doubts concerning the propriety of deferral,
which assures that at least one Court of Appeals will not accept the new
deferral policies. Despite statements that the Board has broad discretion
with respect to deferral to the arbitration process, other courts will probably
not accept policies which leave such doubts that the act has been enforced.
A PROPER TREATMENT OF PRIOR AWARDS AS EVIDENCE
The Board in Olin Corp. was responding to the judicial concern for
"congruence" between the contractual issues and the statutory issues when
it established the standard for deferral that the contractual issue be "fac-
tually parallel" to the unfair labor practice issue. 126 The "congruence" and
"factually parallel" formulations might serve adequately as a test for the
effect to be given arbitral determinations of factual issues relevant in an
unfair labor practice case. They do not adequately address problems of
contract interpretation and unilateral action created by the previously dis-
cussed unsatisfactory state of the law concerning the duty to bargain during
the term of a collective bargaining agreement. If the proposed view of that
duty were adopted there would be no need to develop a system of accom-
modation between two overlapping jurisdictions concerned with the mean-
ing of the contract and the bargaining obligation. Some cases might involve
a question of whether the contract as construed by the arbitrator violated a
provision of the Act. 127 For the most part, however, what are now considered
problems of post-arbitral deference would be seen as merely evidentiary
problems. The question would be whether the arbitration decision ade-
quately disposed of the factual issues in the unfair labor practice case in a
way that justified dismissal of a charge based on principles of resjudicata or
collateral estoppel.
The decision would turn on pragmatic considerations such as the evi-
dence presented, the additional evidence which might have been available
with adequate investigation and discovery, the procedures followed, the
arguments presented, the arguments considered, and the disposition made
of those arguments. As noted with some frequency, most arbitrators are
125. Id. at 811.
126. Member Hunter, dissenting in Propoco Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 145 (1982), expressed the
view that the proposed test of factually parallel issues comported with the views of reviewing courts.
127. An arbitrator might, for example, decide a representation dispute on the basis of contract
language in a manner inconsistent with the Board's rules concerning accretions to exisitng units, or a
dispute concerning no solicitation rules in a manner violative of section 8(a)(1).
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unlikely to conclude that a discharge or discipline is for "just cause" if it
has a controlling source in anti-union motivation, and they are probably as
competent as administrative law judges to make that factual determination.
If the issues in such a case are only factual and the arbitrator concludes and
states after full and fair presentation of evidence, that the challenged action
was not based upon improper motivation, that decision might be accepted
as sufficient reason for dismissing a charge. Even in such cases considera-
tion must be given to the care, detailed consideration, and understanding of
proof of causation revealed by the decision. 128
If the problem is one of weighing evidence at the investigatory stage of a
proceeding, it is, as stated above, one better treated by the General Counsel
than the Board. It is, of course, representatives of the General Counsel in
the regional offices who are responsible for determining whether evidence
produced by a charging party justifies investigation by Board field exam-
iners, and whether, considering evidence produced by an investigation, a
complaint should issue.129 There are no great policy questions in such
determinations and only generalized statements can be made concerning
the process of decision of whether a complaint should issue. It is at this
point, however, that meaningful support can be given to the arbitration
process. Deferral later by the Board, or even an administrative law judge,
does not spare the parties the expense of a second proceeding. 130 With a
record already made there is little justification for refusing to make an
independent determination of the facts for the purposes of the unfair labor
practice proceeding.
The Board's Statement of Procedures, Rules and Regulations now
informs the concerned public how that investigation is carried out. 131 It
should be supplemented with statements concerning the detail and form of
arbitration decisions which will be given weight in the assessment of the
evidence supporting a charge. As Professor Morris has suggested, 132 the
General Counsel should also publish decisions and awards considered in
determining that a charge should be dismissed, or at least a representative
128. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 395 (1983); Wright Line, A
Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980).
129. NLRB: Statement of Procedures, Rules, and Regulations, 29 C.ER. §§ 101.4-101.6(1984).
130. But see supra note 105.
131. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.4-101.6.
132. Morris, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: The Arbitrator's Awesome Responsibility,
in PROC. OF THE ANNUAL MEErtNG, NArIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS, ABSENTEEISM, RECENT LAW,
PANELS, AND PUBuSHED DECisIONs 51 (W. Gershenfeld ed. 1984). Professor Morris suggests that such
publication could be required pursuant to NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), and that
such publication would not violate the confidentiality requirements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Arbitrators because it would be a publication required or permitted by law within the
meaning of 2C1(e) of the Code. Id. at 69.
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sample of such decisions and awards should be indexed and made available
for publication by private supporting services.
If the problems with what is now considered post-arbitral deferral go
beyond the question of whether the evidence will support the issuance of a
complaint, the award should not have a controlling effect. For example,
arbitrators may not have the legal competence to decide whether a refusal to
use unsafe equipment is a protected concerted activity, whether a con-
tractual limitation on distribution of literature interferes with section 7
rights, or whether a provision permitting discipline of shop stewards adopts
a prohibited form of discrimination. Decisions of arbitrators competent to
determine the meaning of contractual provisions relating to those matters
carry no guarantee that the Labor Management Relations Act has been
enforced. Indeed, as frequently noted, arbitrators are retained by the parties
to decide cases on the basis of the collective bargaining agreement and not
as public judges to enforce the external, public law. 133 It may be that an
arbitrator's decision will establish the facts of an event or course of action in
a manner that will permit the regional office or the General Counsel to
decide that on that fact pattern no violation can be established. That
decision should be made much like the decisions made in regional offices
after completion of a field investigation, and should not be an acceptance of
the arbitrator's conclusion about statutory issues.
This suggested limitation on the role of prior arbitration awards in unfair
labor practice proceedings is supported by three relatively recent decisions
of the Supreme Court. The first decision, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 134 involved the question of the effect of a prior arbitration award upon
a suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court decided
that the contractual and statutory rights were separate, that an individual did
not forfeit his statutory right by asserting a contractual right, and rejected an
election of remedies argument. 135 Likewise rejected were the arguments
that it was unfair to give an employee two strings to his bow (sometimes
colloquially rephrased as two bites at the apple), while the employer has but
one, and the argument that permitting subsequent resort to the courts would
133. See, e.g., American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Cleveland Local, AFL-CIO
(AFTRA) v. Store Broadcasting Co., 745 F2d 392 (6th Cir. 1984). See generally, Howlett, The
Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, in PROC. OFTHE20TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBrIRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE CoURrs 67 (D. Jones ed. 1967); Meltzer,
Ruminations about ldeology, Law, and Labor Relations, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (1967); Mittenthal, The
Role of Law in Arbitration, in PROC. OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 42 (C. Rehmus ed. 1968); Platt,
The Relations Between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REV. 398
(1969).
134. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
135. Id. at 51.
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undermine the arbitration process. 136 Employees have two bows, not one,
and the reasons for employer acceptance of arbitration provisions are strong
enough to ensure their continuous use despite an occasional use of both the
processes of arbitration and the judicial process. Of greater pertinence for
present purposes is the fact that the Court's appraisal of the arbitration
process found it wanting as a vehicle for vindication of Title VII rights. 137
The Court concluded that it would not therefore adopt a policy requiring
courts to defer to arbitration awards by analogy to the NLRB's Spielberg
decision. Instead, the Court suggested that the arbitral decision could be
admitted by the district court and "accorded such weight as the court deems
appropriate." 138 Limiting the effect of the prior award to its evidentiary
impact, of course, supports the proposal made above.
The significance of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. for the NLRB's
deferral problems might be limited, if one accepted the proposition that
elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
national origin, etc., has a much higher priority in national employment
policies than protection of section 7 rights under the Labor Management
Relations Act or the protection and promotion of the collective bargaining
process. It could also be limited by consideration that frequently the
unlawful employment practices challenged in a suit under Title VII had
been jointly established by managements and unions, or that unions at least
had a complicity in the continuation of those practices, making arbitration a
suspect process for vindication of Title VII rights.
These arguments lost most of their force in 1981, when the Supreme
Court decided Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System. 139 In that case
the Court held employees were not barred from asserting claims for wages
under the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act after
having submitted a wage claim based on the same underlying facts for a
final and binding decision by ajoint grievance committee. After noting the
136. Id. at 54-55.
137. Id. at 56-59.
138. Id. at 60. In footnote 21 of the decision the Court said:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since this must be
determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that
conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum,
adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of
particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's
Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the issue
is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis
of an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory
employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.
139. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
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important role of arbitration in the national labor policy, the Court rejected
the argument that submission of the claims for resolution in the binding
grievance procedures barred the plaintiffs from asserting their statutory
claims in court. 140 In doing so, it relied upon its prior decision in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., finding unpersuasive the argument that a Fair
Labor Standards Act claim was based upon disputed subjects at the heart of
the collective-bargaining process, and hence one for which deferral was
more appropriate. 141 It would not permit the statutory claim to be precluded
by arbitration because (1) the union might without breaching its duty of fair
representation decide not to support the claim vigorously in arbitration, and
(2) the competence of arbitrators relates "primarily to the law of the shop,
not the law of the land.' 142 Arbitrators competent at making factual
determinations might not be competent to decide whether the statute had
been violated, and even if a particular arbitrator had competence to deal
with statutory issues, he might not have the contractual authority to do
so. 143 Moreover, the remedial powers of an arbitrator are not the same as
those of a court under the statute. 144 As in Gardner-Denver, the statutory
right was considered to be independent of the contractual right. 145 The
majority's rejection of a valid distinction between Gardner-Denver and the
case before it was underscored by Chief Justice Burger's argument in
dissent that the Civil Rights Act embodied much more important and
fundamental rights than those created by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 146
As it had done in Gardner-Denver, the Court noted that an arbitral decision
might have evidentiary bearing on a subsequent FLSA suit in court. 147 And,
consistent with the suggestion made here concerning the meaning of a
collective bargaining agreement, the Court stated its expectation that in
determining whether time was non-compensible under a bona fide collec-
tive bargaining agreement a trial court would defer to a prior arbitration
decision construing the relevant provisions of the collective-bargaining
agreement. 148
140. Id. at 734-37.
141. Id. at 737-38.
142. Id. at 742-43 (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
143. Id. at 744.
144. Id. at 744-45.
145. Id. at 745-46.
146. Id. at 749 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 743-44, n.22.
148. Id. at 741-42, n.19. See American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Cleveland
Local, AFL-CIO (AFTRA) v. Store Broadcasting Co., 745 F.2d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1984), in which while
ordering the enforcement of an arbitration award, the court expressed the view that the rationale of
Barrentine would apply equally as well to NLRA complexities of the relationship of arbitration
decisions to public law.
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Most recently, in April 1984, the Supreme Court again held that an
arbitrator's award in a proceeding under a collective bargaining agreement
should not be given preclusive effect, this time in a suit under section 1983
of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act. 149 Once again, arbitration was
found wanting as an adequate substitute for judicial protection of federal
rights. The arbitrator's expertise did not extend to the complex legal
questions arising under section 1983; the arbitrator did not have authority to
enforce public laws; the union's exclusive control of access to the arbitration
forum made arbitration unsuitable for enforcement of individual rights; and
arbitral fact-finding was not generally the equivalent of judicial fact-find-
ing. Nevertheless, as in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver, the arbitral award
might be admitted in evidence in the 1983 action for what weight it might
carry.
The three decisions are consistent in their view that contractual rights are
separate and distinct from statutory rights. They are consistent in their views
of the limitations of the arbitration process for solving disputes other than
those concerning the meaning and application of a collective bargaining
agreement. They limit the possible significance of a prior arbitration
decision in a subsequent court action to its evidentiary value. They do not
permit a prior arbitration to deprive protected parties of their statutory
rights. Deferral is appropriate only in those situations in which the statutory
right turns upon the meaning of a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement. In short, they support the proposal made here.
CONCLUSION
The Spielberg case presented the relatively simple question of whether
controlling effect should be given to an arbitral conclusion that certain
strikers had engaged in picket line misconduct that justified the termination
of their employment. The question was largely, although not exclusively,
whether the Board should conduct a second fact-finding proceeding. From
that modest beginning the Board has developed elaborate formulas to
govern the relationship between its jurisdiction and the arbitration process.
The development, perhaps better described as a meandering, has been
marked by advances as well as major retreats, followed by uncertain returns
to previously abandoned principles. The Board's failure to develop a real-
istic and satisfactory rule concerning the duty to bargain during the term of
a collective bargaining agreement has greatly aggravated the problems of
the relationship between the Board and the arbitration process. That failure
149. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
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produced a pre-arbitral deferral policy, later applied to unfair labor prac-
tices unrelated to the bargaining process. The confusion created by the
changes in policy obviously have been undesirable. More to be regretted is
that the policies pursued, and particularly those recently adopted, lead to
the loss of statutory rights of individuals and failures to enforce the policies
of the National Labor Relations Act.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court establish that the arbitration
process, important as it is, should not be given a preferred position that
frustrates achievements of the policies of statutes governing the employ-
ment relationship. The predictable challenges to the recently adopted
deferral policies will provide courts with opportunities to consider whether
the Board should be permitted to defer to arbitration awards. The major
problem involves charges that unilateral action taken by a party violates the
duty to bargain. It should be recognized as a problem of administration,
scheduling, and procedure best handled by the General Counsel of the
Board. His representatives should postpone decisions of whether to issue a
complaint only where arbitration may establish the meaning and effect to
be given to a collective bargaining agreement and thus permit determina-
tion whether or not an unfair labor practice has occurred. In other cases,
arbitration awards should be given only what persuasive effect the General
Counsel's representatives conclude they have as evidentiary matter.
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